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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LEE ROY WOOD,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Case No. 20050221-CA
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a petition for post-conviction
relief, which challenged convictions for Aggravated Murder, a capital offense, two counts
of Attempted Aggravated Murder, first degree felonies, and Aggravated Kidnaping, a first
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j) (West 2005).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue I: Should petitioner's claims be dismissed because they are inadequately
briefed?
Standard of Review: "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.5 Utah R. App. P. 24(j)." State v. Gamblin,
2 0 0 0 U T 4 4 , p , lP.3d!108.

2

Issue II: Did the district court properly deny and dismiss the petition for postconviction relief?
Standard of Review: The following standard of review applies:
Our standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. Though we review the
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, we will disturb findings of fact
only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, '"we survey the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there
is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be convinced
that the writ should be granted.'"
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal:
Addendum B - Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (Prisoner's demand for disposition).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 10, 2001, petitioner Wood was charged by Information with one count of
Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder, a capital offense; two counts of Attempted Criminal
Homicide, Aggravated Murder, first degree felonies; one count of Aggravated Kidnaping,
a first degree felony; one count of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony; and one count
of Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by Restricted Person, a second degree
felony. In addition, notice was given that the State intended to seek the firearm sentencing
enhancement (R. 338-342).

3

On August 15, 2001, a telephone conference was held. The prosecutor and counsel
for Wood asked the court to set the preliminary hearing on December 10th and 11th, 2001.
The preliminary hearing was set for those dates (R. 335-36).
On November 28, 2001, petitioner's counsel advised the court that they believed
Wood needed to have a competency evaluation before proceeding with the preliminary
hearing (R. 332-33). They therefore requested that the preliminary hearing be continued.
The preliminary hearing was re-scheduled for January 22, 2002. Id.
On December 13,2001, the Order granting the petition for competency evaluation was
filed (R. 329-30). The competency evaluation was not completed in time for the scheduled
January 22nd preliminary hearing (R. 326-27). The preliminary hearing was re-scheduled for
April 4-5, 2002. Id.
On March 8,2002, Wood was found competent (R. 322-24). The preliminary hearing
was held on April 4, 2002 (R. 316-20). The Court again noted on the record that it found
Wood to be competent. Id. Wood was bound over for trial (R. 313-14).
Various motions were filed and addressed. On August 16, 2002, the parties filed a
written stipulation to change venue (R. 310-11). At a hearing on August 19, 2002, counsel
for Wood made a motion to vacate the jury trial date because the new venue needed to be
determined, and also because there was a Bill before the legislature dealing with mental
health issues, and they wanted the jury trial set after the legislature made a decision as to

4

whether or not that Bill would pass (R. 3 07-8). The trial date was continued and Wood stated
on the record that he waived his right to a speedy trial. Id.
On August 20, 2002, the parties were notified that if the case were transferred to the
Fourth District Court in Heber, Utah, it would be March 2003 before the jury trial could be
set (R. 304-5). Petitioner's counsel stated that Wood had no objection to a March 2003 trial
setting. Id. The court approved the transfer of the case to Fourth District Court in Heber,
Utah. Id. However, the case was never actually transferred, because Wood pled guilty.
On September 19,2002, counsel for Wood withdrew the motion for change of venue
and also withdrew a motion to suppress (R. 298).1 Wood pled guilty to counts I, II, and III.
As part of the plea agreement, "the maximum penalty would be life in prison without parole.
Mr. Wood would concede as part of the plea that was the appropriate sentence." (R. 299).
Also as part of the plea agreement, the remaining counts would be dismissed (R. 266).
The Court asked the parties if they would like to discuss Atkins.2 The parties
indicated that they did not (R. 257-59). Wood waived the time period for sentencing and
requested that sentencing take place that same day. Id.

1

The original transcript of the plea and sentencing hearing on September 19, 2002
is in the court file in case no. 011800225. The transcript includes conversations which
the court and parties stated were in chambers and not on the record. Because the State's
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss would be a public record, only the
portion of the transcript that was considered "on the record" was included as addendum L
(R. 274-302).
2

Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct 2242 (2002).
5

On September 19, 2002, shortly after entering his plea, Wood was sentenced to life
in prison without parole on the Aggravated Murder charge, and five years to life on each of
the Attempted Aggravated Murder charges. The sentences were to run consecutively (R.
248-50,252-55 & 287).
Wood did not file any timely motion to withdraw plea or any timely notice of appeal.
On December 10,2002, Wood filed a pro se motion to withdraw plea (R 241-46). He filed
an amended motion to withdraw plea on January 9,2003 (R. 236-39). On January 29,2003,
the motion to withdraw plea was denied because it was untimely (R. 233-34). Wood
apparently did not appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw plea.
On July 16,2003, Wood filed a state petition for post-conviction relief (R. 7-16). On
April 7, 2004, Wood filed a pro se amended petition for post-conviction relief (R. 88-97).
In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum (R. 225-369).
On February 9,2005, the district court entered is ruling, which granted the State's motion to
dismiss (R. 395-406) (addendum A).

!

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3
"On 07-06-01 Lee Roy Wood obtained an SKS rifle from the Mike Swett residence
located at 1757 West 750 North. Lee also met with an individual who will be referred to as
'K.P.' While at the Swett residence K.P. and Wood began to argue. This argument resulted

3

The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R. 230-31). The facts are
double spaced for ease of reading.
6

in Wood pointing the SKS rifle at K.P., threatening to kill her, and ordering K.P. to get into
a truck and drive.
K.P. did as instructed. K.P. and Wood then traveled West on Highway 40. While
traveling West on Highway 40 the fight continued and K.P. was physically assaulted by
Wood. Wood allowed K.P. to stop at the Maverik convenience store to use the restroom.
Wood followed K.P. into the convenience store and waited near the bathroom door. As K.P.
exited the restroom, Wood rapidly paid for items purchased, exited the store, and again began
to verbally abuse K.P. This argument continued, and according to witnesses Wood retrieved
the SKS rifle from the vehicle and pointed the rifle at K.P. Wood then ordered K.P. back
into the vehicle to leave the area.
During the argument Law Enforcement was contacted by a witness.
K.P. entered the vehicle, backed out of the parking lot onto Union Street, and stopped
due to the arrival of Police Officers.
Upon the arrival of Law Enforcement Officers K.P. stopped the vehicle, and Wood
exited the vehicle from the passenger side door of the truck. Wood retrieved the SKS firearm
from the vehicle and aimed the rifle at Roosevelt Police Officer Henry McKenna. Wood
then began pulling the trigger of the rifle attempting to shoot Officer McKenna. Wood then
realized that the rifle did not have a live round in the chamber. Wood activated the weapon
and shifted the rifle to his left aiming it at Roosevelt Police Officer Lance Williamson. As
Wood was aiming the rifle at Williamson, he was verbally challenged by Roosevelt Police
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nimril lln" rilk' >it (liief«iurr and fired a total of live * ?) rounds, one of which struck Chief
Gurr in the head causing death. Wood then got back into -he passenger side of the truck and
ordered K.P. to drive due to the fact that he i tad just shot a police officer
As k.I". wdii diivmjj, Vw;\( mi i 11illiw*t\ III ^

Il na-i piunling i)\c ullr il Imci

V« rood sat the rifle on the seat, K.P seized the opportunity to grab the rifle and throw it out
the window. i;iw suspect vehicle was stopped b\ Roosevelt Police Officers near 350 East
400 North in Roosevelt Citv nnd Lcc f«
locatk i

.

.

»• -w

• " . - v>

us tukch ndo cust v^viv. wnue ai

••

[ urt'iccr McKnii

:'. *fPivr *' u h.- -iM.vr ^-edio murder, aiidiliui lie hoped the Officer he'd shot would
die.
It should be noted that Lee Roy Vv ood is current!} * a\ i v.-a,.; ui i a or^aon. .->;„u . ... le,
and is a com icled bJuii nliut HIIIIHI possess a lire
SUMMARY OF TEE ARGUMENT
Petitioner's claims should be dismissed because they are inadequately briefed.
Petitioner does not appropriate u u m j a uic dui^i .. ,
attempts to raise • the sa i ne argi lment he raised in his petition for post-conviction relief
Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner merely asserts facts and opinions
that he believes support his claim and concludes that he is entitled to relief This does not
conform, to the requirements of the briefing i ule.

8

Even if petitioner's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the district
court should be affirmed because the petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied
and dismissed. The district court ruled correctly that there was good cause for failing to
bring the matter to trial within 120 days (addendum A). In the alternative, the decision of the
district court should be affirmed because petitioner waived any claim concerning 120-day
disposition by entering his guilty plea without raising the issue.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER'S CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
IT IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED.

Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. However,
in his appellate brief, petitioner simply raises one of the arguments he raised in his postconviction petition. Petitioner does not challenge the decision of the district court. He has
not argued or established that any of the court's findings were clearly erroneous, or that its
conclusions of law were incorrect. Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner
merely asserts facts and opinions that he believes support his claim, and then concludes that
he is entitled to relief. This does not conform to the requirements of the briefing rule.
Inadequate Briefing. Rule 24 (a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires
an appellant to include his "contentions and reasons... with respect to the issues presented,"
including "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." This Court

9

•'re-
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T - " ^ i r . J d 1108 (refusingiO consider nrr>:ment whichi&iikuk* " ' v u — v V '
v Hiinfw ^ 3 P : J ^ \

MacKay

-U-7-48 (TJlar

Utah courts have consi^icini) iiuu uiai issues not properly briefed should not be

court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited.'" State v.
Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citingState

v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 4 3 9 , 4 5 0 (Utah

error by the district court. It does not cite to the record; nor does it cite applicable authority.
It also does not provide any meaningful legal analysis. See State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247
,: UA. \ p p . vw:.

• /,. .. . . ,,ur-<i tl r\ \A i

w :

l a i i A p p . 1995).

petition for post-conviction relief should be overturned on appeal. Sec Utah R. .'i ^

\\

24(a)(9) (providing that argument section of appellant's brief must "contain the contentions
a iici reasons - i :.... jppciiai.i

•-. Ah respect to the issues presented

i iic b l a i c c^kiu v\ i^Uj-v.

with citations to the

I'i-w..^ liiuSt be cujiMi'ueu iiDtriaiiv.

)ct

\hnl

< 4 '•:.-•. 179F.R.D.6(N. 61'Ju.- . .. •!..:.-icyv.StateofNM, 113 F.3d 1170. I P :
(10th Cir. 1997). HOV\CN .T, pro se litigants must still comply with minimal standards. Id.
If errors alleged in the pro se brief, even if properly presented, would not amount to
reversible error, they do not require full analysis. See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55
(Utah 1993).
10

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority5'); State v.
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (holding that brief "must contain some support for
each contention").
In sum, this Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404,410 (Utah 1999) (quoting
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)), and see Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305.
Accordingly, petitioner's claim should be rejected. See Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to
consider appellant's claim due to the lack of meaningful analysis of cited authority);
Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on appeal where petitioner's brief
"wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to support his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 1998) (same); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.
1992) (same).
Failure to Marshal. Petitioner's claim also fails because his grounds for relief
ignore the district court's findings and conclusions in support of its rulings (R. 395-406)
(Addenda A). The law is well-settled that although the Court of Appeals will "review the
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, [it] will disturb findings of fact only if they
are clearly erroneous. Further, "'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the
findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to
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suppo
!> '

\ '
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rtah A p r
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A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against the clear weight of
the evidence'" or if the reviewing court, '"reaches a definite and, firm,, conviction,'" that they

P 2d 191, , 193 ( [ Ita h 1 98 ) )) 1 1 le bi irden is on the petitioner to marshal all of the evidence
in support of the district court's findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not
si ipportthe findings. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, A+6P * 1 (Utah 1994). If the petitioner
makes no a ttemptt : marshal thee i< idence si ip.*-- ...

..

• . . • • : .

its insufficiency, this Court "accept[s] the 'trial court's findings as stated in its ruling

oiuit

v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1,999).
Petitioner iaij> to carry his burden, llcrclci^oiilv iw iacts or events which he relieves

oil in-: he is entitled to relief. Because petitioner has failed to marshal the support ir^:
evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency, this Court should, accept the district court.'s
iiiiuiriL:^. lienvenuto, 983 I \2d at 5.58.

._ .

supporting the district court's findings, nor demonstrates its inadequacy

Therefore, this

Court should decline to consider petitioner's challenge to (he district court.'s ruling
uismissingivr; ;X.;K;OII

I J\

post-eon\ laion

I C . ^ L :.CL ^;i.*..^i<.,:
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i .;<. ,,. i:.u . >

789, 800 (Utah 1991) (failure to marshal evidence); Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (failure to
meaningfully analyze claims).
II.

THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WAS
PROPERLY DISMISSED.

Even if this Court were to excuse the failures of petitioner' s brief, review of the action
below nevertheless establishes that the petition for post-conviction relief was properly
dismissed.5
A.

Although the post-conviction court reached the
merits, this Court should affirm on the alternative
basis that petitioner waived his claim concerning 120day disposition by pleading guilty.

The post-conviction court reached the merits of the 120-day disposition issue before
dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. However, "[i]t is well settled that an
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling.5" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^[10, 52
P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, \ 18, 29 P.3d 1225.
The only issue petitioner raises on appeal is that his case was not brought to trial
within 120 days. However, his case never went to trial. Instead, petitioner chose to enter a
guilty plea, without raising any claim concerning his request for 120-day disposition.

5

The post-conviction court ruled on several other issues that petitioner has not
raised on appeal. Therefore, they are not at issue in this appeal.
13

petitioner was nut eiiuheu iu pusl-conviction reif * K ;ir.^
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.:\r:

concerning 120-day disposition by entering'his guilty plea ^R. }5$«59). The dismissal of the
petition for post-conviaiun renci MIUUUI IK aI"firmed on this alternative basis.

jurisdictional defects, including pre -plea constitutional violations. See State v. Parson-'. "^ *
P . 2 d l 2 7 5 '< 27$ <\:Vdh\W9):

State v.Serv
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'>SN- f he 120-

day disposition run. i* nui jui I>UICIIOIJ.U IJ» i a u . u i> not ~vcn 3 constitutional right It is a
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B) I herefoi e,

entry of a ^riltv plea waived any allegation of violauon ui the 120-dav disposition statute.
tV

McCarthy

voluntary guilty plea constitutes an admission of the elements of the offense. See
united States', J v -•

- .

*

u^ura. Maaza* .

arUi-n. 852P.2d

988, i
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court thai he is 111 fact iMiiln . >i Uic offense
charged, he nia-- \/A thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entv) o i ihe guilty plea." 1 bllett v.

^

Henderson,

I 1 1 [ ) S 258. 26 7 93 S CI 1602, 36 I , Ed 2d 235 (1/973),
By entering his guilty plea, petitioner Wood waived any claim concerning alleged
violations of his request for 120-day disposition, The fact that he was waiving his rights by
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pleading guilty was clearly explained to him. At the time of entry of his guilty plea, the
following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: You give up your right to appeal on any claim of
evidence gathered in violation of your constitutional rights. Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if evidence was gathered in
violation of your constitutional rights, that evidence would be suppressed and
not be available to the prosecution at the time of trial? Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: So when I tell you you give up your right to appeal on
that basis, you give up the right to challenge the evidence in violation of your
constitutional rights. Do you understand that, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
* * *

THE COURT: I want to point out at this time your limited basis for
appeal at this point. Because there isn't any trial, there aren't any issues you
could appeal, which may have arisen at the time of the trial. Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I made it clear, you give up your right to an appeal based
upon the ruling of the court, and based upon any violation of constitutional
rights. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

15

ill; CAJ \ ' i u f ; ij^j) uu give ^up your rights with respect to the issue of
..j\,ression iK*H -^ J i<ih- t4ith? because that's been withdrawn Do yoi i

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
(R. 294-95).
I he issue after a defendant pleads guilty is not the merits of any possible pre-plea
claims, hul whefhci (lie guilty pirn wns mink iiitcllisenllv 1.11 nl \ nhiiilanh HI in I \M(II Ihr.ulv ii v
of competent counsel. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 265. a A counseled plea of guilty is an admission
of factual guilt so reliable that, whci e '- >. luntary and intelligent it c\\x\\c \ ahdly removes the
i

......

.

Sta'c" • '^v~ ^:v* ' - . *• "• *

. . _ ^ , , la.uiu. ^u,,; ; a ^ai;^>wiH Dasis for the
5
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constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with die \aliu establishment of factual
guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established "
/I fennt 1 1 • /V e 1 v 1 01 k, 423 1 I S 1 51 , n.2, < »6 S C 1 2 41, 1 61 Ed 2d'1 95(19 J 5). .
By entering his guilty plea, petitioner Wood wai v edallnon : ji irisdictional defects
therefore wraived any allegations concerning 120-day disposition. He therefore was not
entiiku to post-conviction relief based on any allegations concerning 120-day disposition.

pOSt-conviction relief.
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B.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on his
allegations concerning 120-day disposition.

Even if petitioner had not waived his claim concerning 120-day disposition, he was
still not entitled to post-conviction relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that the district "court
misunderstood the whole 120 day issue." (pet.'s brief at 1). He claims that he "[pjlainly
stated that it was the Utah State Prison's Agent that misfiled the 120 day disposition, not the
county attorney office or the court." Id. Petitioner then broadly asserts that because the
"agent Plaintiff failed to file the 120 day disposition" he "believes he is entitled to relief."
Id. at 3.
However, petitioner ignores or perhaps misinterprets the district court's ruling on this
issue. The district court noted that "the Notice which Petitioner claims he filed at the prison
was not filed with the Court; nor was the Court informed that a Notice had been filed.
Therefore, the criminal case proceeded without any consideration of the unlawful detainer
statute. Because Petitioner did not file a Motion to Dismiss, the State was similarly not
aware of the filing of the Notice. Consequently, the State was not given an opportunity to
request that the trial be held within the statutory period." (R. 404).
Nevertheless, for purposes of the State's motion to dismiss, the district court assumed
that petitioner filed his 120-day disposition notice with the prison on 7/20/01, that he
requested his counsel to file a motion to dismiss, and that counsel failed to file a motion to
dismiss (R. 404). The district court therefore analyzed the issue as if the request for 120-day
disposition had been properly filed. The district court determined that even if the request for
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1 W-d/iv disposihon haul been properly filed on llic dale pi fidonu ,(lieges he g a u (lie notice
to the prison, petitioner would not be entitled to relief,
The district court went through a lengthy review where it set out the matters that
occurred in the criminal case from the time that petitioner alleges he filed his notice for 120ilay disposition until he enlereil Ins innll\ plea (K. \{H> --III I addendum A). I he district court
discussed continuances and the reasons forthoseeonliniiaiu'es fhr request ioi a eoinpelen •>
evaluation; the designation of expert witnesses; motion to retain Dan Jones to conduct a
survey; and numerous other motions such as motion to quash the bindover, motion to exclude
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motion to exclude bad acts, and motion for jury view of scene. In addition, defense counsel
requested a moL.^i

,» * change of venue and defense counsel told the court he had no
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r h e statute provides that even after a written demand I <j :"*^ "
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delivered as required, the parties "for good cause shown ., . .may be granted any reasonable
i'onliiiuance. n Utah l 'ode Ann. ij / / ^ M ( J ) , I'ol lowing its lengthy review, the district court
determined that if I he lime periods lor n i l a inn i, i mil nuances were e\ rinded, ml u\\ \ mid i edut e
the time below the 120 day threshold." (R. 598).
The statute also provides that if the court finds that the failure to have the matter heard
v\ ilhin llic lime required "is not suppo:^....;, ^ *.*« .u l t -^
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Mi«m o,der ihe matter dismissed.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). The district court determined that even assuming the matter
was not heard within 120 days, there was "good cause" for failing to bring the matter to trial
within 120 days (R. 396-98).
Finally, the district court also concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing
to file a motion to dismiss (R. 396).
To be entitled to relief on appeal, petitioner must establish that the district court's
findings of fact are clearly erroneous, or that its conclusions of law are incorrect. Petitioner
has failed to meet this burden. Petitioner has failed to establish that the ruling by the district
court was incorrect. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of the
petition for post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments set forth above, the State asks this Court to affirm the district
court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <?(l day of September, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

ERIN RILEY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Addendum A

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FILED
LEE ROY WOOD,
Petitioner,

:

UINTASCSK^OJAH

:

VS.

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondent

RULING

FEB 0 9 2005
Bv

JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
^ J
DEPUTY

Case No.: 030800480

:

This matter comes before the Court on the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Previously
Judge Anderson has ruled upon the Petitioner's Claim that Counsel was ineffective in not filing
an appeal when the Court did not recuse itself on its own motion. The initial Petition also raised
issues as to whether the Petitioner entered his plea voluntarily and whether the Petitioner's
counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of the decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U S.
304 (2002). The Amended Petition raised additional issues as to whether Petitioner's trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Motion to Dismiss under 77-29-1; (The State
unlawful detainer statute). There is also some language which indicates that the Petitioner claims
that his Constitutional Right to a speedy trial was violated. There are, therefore, four issues
currently before the Court. In his Amended Petition the Petitioner lists grounds (a) through (k) as
grounds for relief. Except for the two issues identified in the foregoing paragraph, the Petitioner
has not provided any allegations, legal analysis, evidence, or case law to support his allegations
in the Amended Complaint. Furthermore, as Respondent argues, the Petitioner's guilty plea
effectively waived all non-jurisdictional pre-plea defects, including pre-plea constitutional
violations.1 Therefore, all claims in the Amended Complaint except the issues relating to speedy
trial are dismissed.
1. Plea Entered Unlawfully and Involuntarily
As stated above, the Petitioner claims he entered his guilty plea in order to avoid the
death penalty The Petitioner further claims that he is mentally retarded and would not be subject
to the death penalty pursuant to the Atkins decision. Petitioner argues that, had he been made
aware of Atkins and its implications, he would not have entered the guilty plea.

*See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938
(UtahApp. 1988)
1

The Petitioner has not provided any evidence that indicates he qualifies as mentally
retarded pursuant to Atkins. In Atkins, the Supreme Court stated, t,cMild' mental retardation is
typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70.M (quoting the
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic,and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41, 4243 (4th ed. 2000)). Id. at 309 n.3). The only evidence before the Court regarding the Petitioner's
IQ level is that provided by Dr. Eric Neilson. Dr. Neilson reports that the Petitioner "was
administered the Shipley Institute of Living Scale. He generated an estimated IQ of 81 which
would place him in the low average range." The Petitioner has not provided any other evidence
to show that he is mentally retarded and would not be subject to the death penalty pursuant to
Atkins. Therefore, the Petitioner's argument that he entered the guilty plea to avoid a punishment
that he was not subject to (the death penalty) fails.
Pursuant to Atkins, Utah has enacted UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-101, which, consistent
with Atkins, provides that a defendant who is found to be mentally retarded is not subject to the
death penalty. Furthermore, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-102 provides a defendant is mentally
retarded if:
(1) the defendant has significant sub-average general intellectual functioning that
results in and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive
functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or impulse control, or in
both of these areas; and
(2) the sub-average general intellectual functioning and the significant
deficiencies in adaptive functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested
prior to age 22.
Again, there are no facts before the Court which would show the Petitioner qualifies as mentally
retarded pursuant to this statute. The only facts before the Court regarding this issue are those
found in Dr. Eric Neilson and Dr. John Maloufs reports, which do not conclude the Petitioner is
mentally retarded. Additionally, the Petitioner does not argue that the statute does not comply
with Atkins. Based upon these facts, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is Granted as to this
issue,
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - (Atkins)
The Petitioner argues counsel did not inform him regarding the Atkins decision.
Petitioner claims that he would not have entered his plea if he had been made aware of the
implications of that decision.
To meet his burden with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner must
show that his attorney's performance was deficient through an objective standard of
reasonableness, and the deficient performance prejudiced his case. The mere bald allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel are not sufficient to support this ground for relief. Again,
Petitioner has not provided any evidence or alleged facts which would implicate the State statute
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(77-15a-102) or Atkins. Therefore, it can not be said that counsel's performance was deficient
for failure to inform the Petitioner regarding Atkins as he is not an individual within the
protection of Atkins. Petitioner's trial counsel was clearly aware of Atkins and its potential
implications in this matter. During the plea hearing the Court and defense counsel specifically
discussed Atkins and its potential implications. However, defense counsel ultimately stated,
"There's nothing in that case that precludes what were about to do." As previously stated, the
only evidence before the Court regarding the Petitioner's status as mentally retarded is provided
in the psychological evaluations of Dr. Malouf and Dr. Neilson, which do not establish the
Petitioner as mentally retarded under Atkins or 77-15a-102. This claim fails and the Motion to
Dismiss is granted as to this issue.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (120 day detainer - 77-29-1):
The Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Motion to Dismiss
under the unlawful detainer statute (77-29-1). In support of this claim, the Petitioner alleges: (1)
He filed Notice with the State Prison on 7/20/01; (2) After 120 days had elapsed (and prior to his
plea) he requested counsel to file a Motion to Dismiss; and (3) Counsel failed to file a Motion to
Dismiss. While there may well be contested issues of fact as to whether an appropriate notice
was filed and/or whether the Petitioner asked counsel to file a Motion to Dismiss; for the
purposes of this Motion the Court will assume these as facts proved. A review of the record
shows that the Petitioner did not file a Motion to Dismiss.
With respect to this issue the Court will note that the Notice which Petitioner claims he
filed at the prison was not filed with the Court; nor was the Court informed that a Notice had
been filed. Therefore, the criminal case proceeded without any consideration of the unlawful
detainer statute. Because Petitioner did not file a Motion to Dismiss, the State was similarly not
aware of the filing of the Notice. Consequently, the State was not given an opportunity to
request that the trial be held within the statutory period.
It will also be useful to consider the statute itself. The statute (77-29-1) is not implicated
until: (1) A Defendant files an appropriate notice; (2) The trial is not held within 120 days; (3)
The Defendant files a Motion to Dismiss; (4) The Trial Court reviews the record and finds that
the failure to hold the trial within 120 days was not supported by good cause. The Defendant has
the burden to prove a notice was properly filed. The statute allows for "Reasonable
continuances" for "good cause". (77-29-1(3)) However, the statute requires that the continuances
be approved "...in open Court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present." The burden to
prove that a continuance was approved pursuant to subsection (3) rests with the State, Even
where the 120 day period has elapsed the case may be dismissed only (1) When the Defendant
files a Motion to Dismiss for failure to bring the matter to trial within 120 days and (2) The Trial
Court reviews the record and finds "...that the failure of the prosecutor to have the matter heard
within the time is not supported by good cause." (77-29-1(4)). Good cause under subsection (4)
exists whenever delay is wholly attributable to the Defendant State v. Heatou 958 P.2d 115
(Utah 1982); State v. Valesquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982); State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551 (Utah
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1991). The State bears the burden of showing that there was good cause for failing to bring the
matter to trial within 120 days.
The issue before the court is whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a
Motion to dismiss. Because the Petitioner did -not file a Motion to Dismiss, he does not (at this
time) argue that he is entitled to dismissal by reason of the operation of the statute. Instead,
Petitioner seeks to have his plea set aside based upon his claim that counsel was ineffective.
With respect to the issue of ineffective assistance, the Petitioner bears the burden to prove that
his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
Petitioner. In considering these issues it will be helpful to establish a time line relating to the
running of the 120 day period.
1. July 20, 2001. Petitioner filed his Notice for 120 day disposition with the Warden
at the Utah State Prison.
2. August 15, 2001. Defense Counsel had been tentatively selected but had not been
formally appointed pursuant to Rule 8 U.R.Cr.P. Counsel stipulated to setting the Preliminary
Hearing on December 10th and 11th, 2001. Elapsed time from paragraph 1 above (7-20-01 to
8-15-01) 26 days.
3. September 11, 2001. Court conducted a Rule 8 (U.R.Cr.P.) hearing and formally
appointed defense counsel (Mr. Brass and Mr. Bugden). The parties stipulated to a trial date
of 9/20/2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 2 above (8-15-01 to 9-11-01) 27 days.
4. November 28, 2001. Defense Counsel requested a competency evaluation. Elapsed
time from paragraph 3 above (9-11-01 to 11-28-01) 78 days. Defense Counsel requested that
the Preliminary Hearing be delayed until after there was a determination of competency.
Preliminary Hearing was rescheduled for 1/22/02.
5. December 10, 2001. Defense Counsel indicated that he may not be able to
designate experts until 3-15-02. The court ordered that the parties make an initial designation
of expert witnesses by 4-15-02 and designate additional expert witnesses by 5-6-02. Elapsed
time from paragraph 4 above (11-28-01 to 12-10-01) 12 days.
6. January 15, 2002. Defense Counsel informed the Court that the competency
evaluation would not be ready by January 22, 2002 (which was the Preliminary Hearing date).
January 22, 2002 was selected as the time to reschedule the competency hearing and
Preliminary Hearing. Elapsed time from paragraph 5 above (12-10-01 to 1-15-02) 36 days,
7. January 22, 2002. The competency evaluation had not been completed. The
competency hearing was therefore continued to April 4th and 5th, 2002 with the Preliminary
Hearing to follow. Elapsed time from paragraph 6 above (1-15-02 to 1-22-02) 7 days.
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8. February 13, 2002. Counsel for Petitioner informed the Court that the competency
issue would be submitted based upon die written evaluations and that no witness would be
called on the issue of competency. Elapsed time from paragraph 7 above (1-22-02 to 2-132002) 22 days.
9. March 8, 2002. Upon review of the competency evaluations the Court made an
initial finding that the Petitioner was competent to proceed. This finding was subject to the
Court receiving and reviewing the curricular vitae of the examiners. The competency issue
was continued until April 4, 2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 8 above (2-13-02 to 3-8-02)
23 days.
10. April 4, 2002. After reviewing the curriculum vitae of each examiner and the
competency evaluation, the Court made a final finding the Petitioner competent. The
Preliminary Hearing was held. Probable Cause was found and the matter was bound over.
Elapsed time from paragraph 9 above (3-8-02 to 4-4-02) 27 days.
11. April 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Retain Dan Jones and Associates to
conduct a survey regarding the likelihood of seating a fair and impartial jury hi Uintah
County, Elapsed time from paragraph 10 above (4-4-02 to 4-12-02) 8 days.
12. April 26, 2002. The State filed its Opposition to the Motion to Retain Dan Jones
and Associates. Elapsed time from paragraph 11 above (4-12-02 to 4-26-02) 14 days.
13. April 29, 2002. In a telephone conference, the Court set oral arguments on the
Motion to Retain Dan Jones and Associates for June 7, 2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 12
above (4-26-02 to 4-29-02) 3 days.
14. May 13, 2002. Petitioner filed Multiple Motions which the Court was required to
rule upon prior to trial These Motions included; (1) Motion to Quash the Bindover; (2)
Motion to Exclude Victim Impact Evidence; (3) Motion to Strike die Death Penalty; (4)
Motion Regarding Death Qualification of the Jury; (5) Motion to Bifurcate Count Six; (6)
Motion to Exclude Photographs; (7) Motion to Exclude Bad Acts; (8) Motion for Jury View of
the Shooting Scene; and (9) Motion to View Shooting Scene, Uintah County Jail and Utah
State Prison. Prior to this time the Court had designated July 8, 2002 as the date for oral
argument on pending motions. Elapsed time from paragraph 13 above (4-29-02 to 5-13-02) 14
days.
15. May 15, 2002. Petitioner filed two Motions: (1) Motion to Suppress Defendant's
statement to Police and (2) Motion for Change of Venue. The Court had previously
designated July 8, 2002 as the time for oral argument on pending Motions. Elapsed time from
paragraph 14 above (5-13-02 to 5-15-02) 2 days.
16. June 7, 2002. The Court heard oral argument on the Motion to Retain Dan Jones
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to Conduct a Poll. The Motion was granted. Defense Counsel requested that the Motion for
Change of Venue not be considered on July 8, 2002. Defense Counsel requested that the
hearing on the Motion be conducted after the poll was concluded and the issue briefed. The
Motion for Change of Venue was scheduled for hearing on August 19, 2002. Elapsed time
from paragraph 15 above (5-15-02 to 6-7-02)23 days.
17. June 20, 2002. The United States Supreme Court published its opinion in Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, holding that certain "retarded" defendants are not subject to the
death penalty under the Eight amendment, The Supreme Court stated that ""mild" mental
retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70."
18. July 8, 2002. The Court heard oral argument on all pending motions. However,
Defense Counsel indicated that he was awaiting review of exhibits on two pending motions (#6
and #7) and was not then able to designate which exhibits he objected to. The Court took
these motions under advisement. The Court ruled upon remaining motions, except the Motion
to Suppress, which was taken under advisement, and the Motion for Change of Venue which
had previously been re-set for hearing on August 19, 2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 16
above (6-7-02 to 7-8-0) 31 days.
19. August 19, 2002. This hearing had been scheduled to hear evidence on the
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to a change
of venue. Defense Counsel made a Motion to Vacate the September 20, 2002 trial date. The
Court granted this Motion. Although the parties had stipulated to a change of venue, they had
not agreed where the trial would be held. The parties also stipulated that the Court rule on the
pending Motion to Suppress. Defense Counsel noted that there was a bill pending hi a special
session of the legislation to address the issues raised in Atkins. Defense Counsel asked the
Court to not schedule the trial until after the legislation was passed (which did not occur until
the regular session which began in January, 2003). Defendant Counsel also raised the
possibility of a hearing regarding mental retardation and an inter locator y appeal. Defendant
specifically waived his right to a speedy trial. Elapsed time from paragraph 18 above (7-8-02
to 8-19-02) 42 days.
20. August 20, 2002. In a telephone conference (which was not on the record) the
Court informed the parties that the Administrative Office of the Court had notified the Court
that, if the case was transferred to the 4th District, it could not be scheduled for trial until
March of 2003. Defense Counsel indicated that he had no objections to a March trial and
stipulated to transferring the case to Heber. Elapsed time from paragraph 19 above (8-19-02
to 8-20-02) 1 day.
21. September 19, 2002. (Sometime prior to this date the parties had indicated that
they had reached a plea agreement which would resolve the case without trial). The parties
indicated that because there was no longer an issue of seating an impartial jury, Defendant
would withdraw his Motion to Change Venue'. Defendant withdrew his Motion to Change
6

Venue and his Motion to Suppress; and entered into a plea which resolved all charges before
the Court. Elapsed time from paragraph 20 above (8-20-02 to 9-19-02) 30 days.
22. The total time between the date Notice was filed (7-20-02) and the date of the plea
was 426 days:
Paragraph

Elapsed Days

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Q
26
27
78
12
36
7
22
23
27
8
14
3
14
2
23
0
31
42
1
30
426

Several periods of time are tolled pursuant to the operation of subsection (4) of the
statute as delays which were attributable to Petitioner:
(1) Mr. Wood engaged in conduct while incarcerated after his arrest which raised
issues as to whether he was competent to proceed. Counsel for Petitioner made a Motion for a
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competency evaluation on November 28, 2001. The State stipulated to an evaluation and the
Court ordered an evaluation. On April 4, 2002 the Court found that Petitioner was competent.
After the parties stipulated to an evaluation, no hearings could be held until after a finding of
competency. The court finds that the delay associated with the determination of competency
was for "good cause" under 77-29-1(4). Therefore, the period between November 28, 2001
and April 4, 2002 (127 days) will not be included for the purpose of computing the 120 day
period.
(2) On April 12, 2002, Counsel for Petitioner filed a Motion to Retain Dan Jones and
Associates to conduct a survey concerning whether an unbiased jury could be seated in Uintah
County. This Motion was filed to allow the Defendant to develop evidence in support of his
Motion to Change Venue. This Motion was granted at a hearing which was held on June 7,
2002. This delay of 56 days (April 12, 2002 to June 7, 2002) was attributable to the
Defendant. The Court finds this delay to be for "good cause" under 77-29-1(4). This period
of time will not be considered in computing the 120 day period.
(3) On May 13, 2002 the Petitioner filed various motions which required a ruling by
the Court prior to trial. Most of these motions were ruled upon at the July 8, 2002 hearing.
However, the Petitioner asked the Court for additional time to designate certain evidence
which he sought to exclude from the jury (Motions #6 and #7). The Petitioner never
designated the evidence which he sought to exclude; so these motions were still pending when
the plea was entered on September 19, 2002. The delay between May 13, 2002 and
September 19, 2002 (129 days) was therefore caused by the filing of the various motions listed
in paragraph 14 above. The delay was for "good cause" under 77-29-1(4). This period of
time will not be included in computing the 120 day period.
(4) On May 15, 2002, the Petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements
to Police. Oral argument on this motion was presented on July 8, 2002 and the Court took the
issue under advisement. The Court had prepared a written Ruling on this Motion but the
Petitioner withdrew the Motion at his plea hearing on September 19, 2002 prior to the Court
entering its Ruling. The delay between May 15, 2002 and September 19, 2002 (127 days) was
therefore caused by the filing of the Motion to Suppress. This was a delay for "good cause"
under 77-29-1(4). This period of time will not be included in computing the 120 day period.
(5) On May 15, 2002 the Petitioner filed his Motion for Change of Venue. This issue
was set for an evidentiary hearing on August 19, 2002. At that hearing the parties stipulated
that the motion should be granted. Defense Counsel made a Motion to Vacate the September
20, 2002 trial date. The delay between May 15, 2002 and August 19, 2002 (96 days) was
caused by the filing of the Motion to Change Venue. The delay was for "good cause" under
77-29-1(4). This period of time will not be included in computing the 120 day period.
With respect to the 426 days between the date that the Notice was filed (7-20-01) and
the date the plea was entered (9-19-02) the Court has found good cause under 77-29-1(4) for
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all periods of time except:
1. From the date the Notice was filed (7/20/01) to the date the parties agreed
upon a Preliminary Hearing date (8/15/01) - 26 days.
2. From the date the parties agreed upon a Preliminary Hearing date (8/15/01)
to the date defense counsel was appointed (9/11/01) - 27 days.
3. From the date defense counsel was appointed (9/11/01) to the date the
Petitioner filed his Motion for a Competency evaluation (11/28/01) -78 days .
4. From the date that the Preliminary Hearing was held (4/4/02) to the date the
Petitioner filed his Motion for a Survey regarding jury bias (4/12/02) - 8 days.
5. Total time:

1) 26 days
2) 27 days
3) 78 days
4) 8 davs
139 days

On August 15, 2001 the parties stipulated that the Preliminary Hearing should be held
on December 10, 2002. On November 28, 2001 the Petitioner requested a competency
evaluation which tolled the running of the 120 day period. There are 105 days (8-15-01 to 1128-01) which may be tolled based on subsection (3) (which excludes certain continuances).
The record does not reflect the factors which caused counsel to agree upon the December 10
Preliminary Hearing date. Because no notice under the unlawful detainer statute had been
provided to the Court or counsel for the State; there was no reason to make a record
concerning this issue or to obtain a ruling as to whether some or all of this period of time
should be excluded under subsection (3). Although the State may claim that some or all of this
time period should be excluded under subsection (3), for the purpose of this Motion the Court
will include the period from 8-15-01 to 11-28-01 in computing the 120 day period. One
hundred and thirty one (131) of the 139 days occurred from the time of the filing of the Notice
(7-20-02) to the time the Motion for a Competency hearing was filed (11/28/01). Defense
counsel was not even "tentatively" appointed until 8/15/01. If the Court merely excluded the
time prior to the "tentative" appointment of counsel (7/20/01 to 8/15/01) 26 days would be
excluded. This would reduce the time below the 120 day threshold.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the 120 day period has ran, the statute (77-29-1 (4))
requires the Court to examine the record to see whether there was "good cause" for the
prosecutors failure to bring the matter to trial within 120 days. As will be more fully
discussed below, even assuming that 139 days had elapsed, there was "good cause" under 7729-1 (4) for failing to bring this matter to trial within 120 days.
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In determining whether "good cause" exists under subsection (4) the Court must
"review the proceeding" and determine whether the failure to bring the matter to trial within
120 days is "supported by good cause". In this case, the following facts are relevant to the
issue of good cause under subsection (4):
1. Neither the State nor the Court was aware that a 120 day Notice had been filed. It
is clear that the 120 day period begins to run when the Notice is filed. For purpose of
computing the 120 day period it is therefore not relevant that the State and the Court had not
been informed of the filing of the Notice. Nevertheless, in considering whether there was
"good cause" for the prosecutor's failure to bring the matter to trial within 120 days it is
certainly relevant that the prosecutor was not aware of the filing of the Notice. Without
notice, neither the prosecutor nor the Court was provided with a motive to provide a trial date
within 120 days.
2. Delay in the Appointment of Defense Counsel. As indicated, 426 days elapsed
between the filing of the Notice (7-20-10) and the plea (9-19-02) Two hundred eighty seven
(287) of the 426 days have been tolled based on delays attributable to the Petitioner.
Therefore, 139 days elapsed prior to the plea. Twenty six of those days elapsed prior to the
time that counsel was tentatively appointed (7-20-01 to 8-15-01). Another 27 days elapsed
prior to the time counsel was formally appointed (8-15-01 to 9-11-01). Even assuming that
counsel was fully functioning when "tentatively" appointed on 8/15/01, 26 days were lost
while counsel was selected and appointed. The procedural process required for appointment of
attorneys in capital cases is unique in criminal law. (See Rule 8 U.R.Cr.P.). Two attorneys
must be appointed. Each must be qualified under the Rule to represent capital defendants.
The Trial Court is required to review the attorney's qualification to ensure that they each meet
Rule 8 requirements. As in this case, capital offenses are often not included in the contracts of
local legal defenders. (Local public defenders were not qualified to represent capital
defendants under Rule 8). This necessitates a certain amount of time to solicit and award
contracts with Rule 8 qualified counsel, As slated, even after a contract is entered into, the
Court must review counsel's qualifications. This takes additional time. For purposes of this
analysis 26 days was not an unreasonable period of time to solicit, appoint, and approve
counsel. No substantive issue could be resolved prior to the appointment of an attorney. The
prosecutor was entirely unable to move the case forward during this 26 day period; and if the
twenty-six days are not considered, the mattei was concluded within 120 days.
3. Capital cases require thorough investigation and preparation. A review of the
Motions filed in this case is instructive as to the complicated issues which are typical of capital
cases (see paragraphs 4, 11, 14, 15 ((pages 4-6)) above). While it may be possible to go
through all of the proceedings necessary to bring a matter to trial within 120 days in most
cases, One hundred and twenty days would not be adequate in many (if not most) capital
cases. One hundred and twenty days is simply not enough time for counsel to investigate and
properly prepare capital cases. On page three of Petitioner's Memorandum Mr. Wood reports
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that when he requested counsel to file a Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Bugden "...said that they
could not do Petitioner's case in 120 days..." This is a clear indication that Petitioner's
counsel did not believe he could adequately prepare the case within 120 days. (Indeed, given
the issues in this case and the opinion of Mr. Bugden, Mr. Bugden would have provided
ineffective assistance of counsel if he would have attempted to try the case before he was able
to provide a full defense on all issues).
Based upon the facts and circumstances in this case the Court concludes that, even
assuming the Petitioner's alleged facts, there was "good cause" under subsection (4) for the
failure of the prosecutor to bring this matter to trial within 120 days.
It is, therefore, clear that counsel was not ineffective in failing to file the Motion to
Dismiss. Given Mr. Bugden's professional opinion that he could not prepare the case for trial
within 120 days; it is clearly within the wide range of discretion allowed trial counsel in
determining trial tactics to refuse to file a motion which would fail. In addition, by filing the
motion, counsel would have introduced the 120 day issue into scheduling decision, which may
have forced the trial to be scheduled prior to the time counsel was prepared to defend the
Petitioner's life. Finally, because there was "good cause" for failing to bring the matter to
trial within 120, the Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to file the Motion.
IV: Speedy Trial - (Constitution)
Although the Amended Petition claims the Petitioner's Constitutional Rights to a Speedy
Trial were violated. The Petitioner does not allege any facts, analysis, or argument under the
constitutional right to a speedy trial (Amendment VI of the United States Constitution). Nor
does the Petitioner raise any facts, analysis, or argument pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16(f), which guarantees the right to a speedy trial afforded by the Utah Constitution, Instead, the
Petitioner bases his claim upon UTAH CODE M . § 77-29-1 et. seq. In addition, on August 19,
2002 the Defendant specifically waived his right to a speedy trial. The Motion is therefore
granted as to the issue of whether the Petitioner was denied a speedy trial under the State and/or
Federal Constitutions.
The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
DATED this %C( day of February, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAY$E, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the «• ^ day of February, 2005, true and correct copies of
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, to: Lee Roy Wood, #18439, Petitioner, at c/o
Central Utah Correctional Facility, P.O. Box 550, Gunnison, UT 84634 and to: Erin Riley,
Assistant Utah Attorney General, at 160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, UT 84/1 4-0854.

M'WVAuA^
Deputy Cj^rk
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Addendum B

UT ST § 77-29-1
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-29-1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*M Chapter 29. Disposition of Detainers Against Prisoners
-f§ 77-29-1. PrisonerTs demand for disposition of pending charge—Duties of
custodial officer—Continuance may be granted—Dismissal of charge for failure
to bring to trial
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison,
jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the
nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought
to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal
delivery
or certified mail,
return receipt
requested,
to the
appropriate
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer
shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney
with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner
as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection
(1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open
court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2.

Jurisdiction Laws Effective Statutory Citation
Date
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Alabama

1978, No. 590 4-27-1978 Code 1975, §§ 15-9-80 to 15-9-88.

Arizona
8.3(b).

17 A.R.S. Rules of C r i m . P r o c ,

Colorado
1969,
16-14-108.
Kansas
1970,
Minnesota
1967,
Missouri
1959,
259
North Dakota .. 1971,
Utah
1980,

rule

p. 291 10-1-1969 West f s C.R.S.A. §§ 16-14-101 to
c. 129 7-1-1970 K.S.A. 22-4301 to 22-4308.
c. 294 5-4-1967 M.S.A. § 629.292.
H.B. 7-1-1971 V.A.M.S. §§ 217.450 to 217.485.
c. 321 NDCC 29-33-01 to 29-33-08.
c. 15 7-1-1980 U.C.A.1953, §§ 77-29-1 to 77-29-4.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

•

Uniform Law
This section is similar to §§ 1 and 2 of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of
Detainers Act. See Volume 11A Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA
Database on Westlaw.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-29-1, UT ST § 77-29-1

Current through end of 2005 First Special Session
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